Virginia Tech National Security Institute spearheads project to strengthen wireless security
Researchers are collaborating with Northrop Grumman engineers to tackle some of the intelligence community’s most pressing challenges in data security.
Virginia Tech researchers on Northop Grumman’s Securing Compartmented Information with Smart Radio Systems (SCISRS) program identifying anomalous signals. Photo by Isabella Rossi for Virginia Tech.
Researchers at the Virginia Tech National Security Institute (VTNSI) are collaborating with Northrop Grumman engineers to tackle some of the intelligence community’s most pressing challenges in data security.
“This project is about pushing the boundaries of radio frequency security,” said Alan Michaels, director of the institute's Spectrum Dominance Division. “We’re exploring new techniques that could fundamentally change how we detect and respond to radio frequency anomalies, ensuring our data remains secure, even in unpredictable environments.”
The institute is a collaborator on Northop Grumman’s Securing Compartmented Information with Smart Radio Systems (SCISRS) program, which launched in 2020 with the aim of developing smart radio techniques to automatically detect and characterize radio frequency anomalies that could signal attempts to compromise secure data. Currently in its third and final phase, the program is ultimately focused on the prevention of rogue signals from bad actors.
The institute was selected to spearhead the program by Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity, which is part of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and invests in high-risk, high-payoff research programs to tackle challenges of the intelligence community. With partner organization Northrop Grumman, they are one of only two research teams to make it to the final phase of the project.
Virginia Tech researchers on Northop Grumman’s Securing Compartmented Information with Smart Radio Systems (SCISRS). From left to right: Alan Michaels, Jacob Dennis, William Clark, William (Chris) Headley, Elliott Rheault, Jaden Leonard, Ben Borlovan, Maymoonah Toubeh, Daniel Jakubisin, Joseph Gaeddert, Alexandra Poetter. Photo by Isabella Rossi for Virginia Tech.
“Northrop Grumman’s focus on innovative and experimental engineering is driving programs like SCISRS from concept to reality.” said John Rogers, senior program manager for Northrop Grumman. “Our partnership with VTNSI is delivering groundbreaking RF [radio frequency ] detection technology to secure our nation’s most sensitive information from emerging threats.”
In the first phase of the project, the research team developed basic algorithms to identify anomalous signals — those that don’t belong.
“We were looking for any radio frequency emitter making noise within a confined space,” said Alyse Jones, a research associate in the institute's Spectrum Dominance Division. “The key challenge was not just identifying if the signals were present, but determining which ones were relevant and needed to be looked into.”
Jones has been working on the SCISRS project for three years, starting when she was a graduate student at Virginia Tech.
“This was an amazing experience for me to get as a student,” Jones said. “As I became full time faculty, I was able to grow with the project and to transition into the areas that I have more interest and expertise in.”
In the second phase, the focus shifted to investigating changed or mimicked signals, such as Wi-Fi or Bluetooth, that look harmless but are actually carrying anomalous information. The team also delved into specific emitter identification, using machine learning to tag the physical hardware that sent a particular signal.
“Imagine having multiple identical radios transmitting the same message,” said William "Chris" Headley, associate director of the institute's Spectrum Dominance Division. “Our goal was to differentiate between them, even if they all appear identical on the surface.”
Now entering the third phase, the project will add the detection of unintended electronic emissions — known as emanations — to its suite of algorithms. These emanations, such as those from common technology like monitors or keyboards, could unintentionally leak secure information.
“It’s like a game of cat and mouse,” said Michaels, who is also a professor of electrical and computer engineering. “The cat is our signal detector, hunting for the mouse. But with emanations, it’s more like finding a chewed-up bag of chips — the remnants tell you that something was there, even if you don’t see the mouse itself.”
